H5N1 in Qingahi and Xinjiang Evolving Via Recombination

Recombinomics Commentary
June 12, 2005

>> The regional director for the World Health Organization, Dr. Shigeru Omi, told reporters in Beijing yesterday that the two recent outbreaks in remote areas in which hundreds of birds died were worrisome because they involved migratory waterfowl and domestic geese, birds that until now had been fairly resistant to the disease. <<

These changes in the pathogenicity of H5N1 are due to recombination. Although the sequences have not been released by the Harbin lab in China, which used the sequence of the HA cleavage site to classify H5N1 isoalted from both outbreaks as HPAI (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza), H5N1 has been evolving and expanding its host range via recombination, ever since it was initially isolated in Asia from a 1996 infection of a goose in Guangdong.

Each season new versions are generated via recombination, and the version in the latest two outbreaks in China may have sequences from India as parental sequences since the first reported bird deaths in Qinghai Lake were bar headed geese found on May 4 and bar headed geese begin migrating from the northern plains of India to Qinghai Lake in May and June.

The current H5N1 version was involved in the death of 519 water fowl (5 species) listed in the May 21 OIE report and additional comments at subsequent press conferences raised the total to over 1000, while third parties reported over 8000 deaths (12 bird species). These Abundant News reports also detail deaths in other mammals, including humans.

The Tacheng, Xinjiang outbreak involved domestic geese and it both outbreaks, the H5N1 isolates rapidly killed test chickens, a property also used in designating the H5N1 HPAI.

This latest version of H5N1 will probably be significantly different than the H5N1 versions in southern Vietnam/Cambodia or northern Vietnam/Thailand and all may be relatively unaffected by antibodies generated against the bird flu pandemic human vaccine which uses 2004 human isolates from Vietnam.

The latest results from China increases the urgency for releasing the sequence data on the new H5N1 as well as on the ground inspections in China and India. Without knowledge of the location and sequences of these newer versions of H5N1 containment and vaccination efforts are destined to fail miserably.

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/0...ombination.html 

Dr. Niman,

Some questions:

1. Have you seen sequence data from the two latest Chinese outbreaks?
2. Without the sequences, why do you conclude possible changes in influenza A viral sequences or structure arose from one or more recombination events?
3. Can you point me towards some peer-reviewed journal articles that explain your theory on influenza A evolution through recombination? 

Oh, and thanks.


M_J
http://www.epidemi.ca/ 

1. Have you seen sequence data from the two latest Chinese outbreaks?

GR: Niman just posted the statement that China has not released the sequences to GenBank.
Q: Do you or anyone you know have the ability to obtain them from China? If yes, will you direct them to GenBank?


2. Without the sequences, why do you conclude possible changes in influenza A viral sequences or structure arose from one or more recombination events?
GR: You know the options for evolution of this virus. I'm a layman and I know there are: reassortment...the hand of god; recombination...the hand of probability; drift...something in the minds of virologists who believe that recombination is a random, unpredictable factor...unpredictable; mutation...which I don't understand.
Q: Do you know of any other ways that influenza virus evolves?

3. Can you point me towards some peer-reviewed journal articles that explain your theory on influenza A evolution through recombination?
GR: What we know is that Niman submitted or is about to submit a paper to Nature which will be peer-reviewed. What we know is that Niman's observations and theories have been patent applied for. We believe that Dr. Niman will keep us abreast of the status of his submission to Nature. 

These terms have nothing to do with a METHOD of genetic change but rather, apply to the net effects. It doesn't matter if drift or shift occurs via recombination or reassortment, although you're more likely to see shift after one or more recombination events.

Drift is GRADUAL genetic change in a subtype leading to a new subtype which is different enough from the old one to warrant it's own name - usually. H3N1 subtypes of recent years are good examples. A/Fujian drifted into A/Wisconsin, A/NewYork, A/California & probably a few dozen others. It's pretty much why annual flu shots are needed. A subtype will have DRIFTED enough from a previous genetic structure so that last year's vax either won't work or will only provide some degree of coverage. The other reason of course is that vax has a 'sell by' time of a year.

Shift is a more radical change in genetic structure. Think of it as going from the letters 'A' to 'M' in one major hop rather than letter by letter. It could theoretically result in a new humanly pathogenic subtype, (H6N7 - which I made up as an example), or may lead to large enough changes in known humanly pathogenic subtypes - such as H2N2 to make the new variant a real kicker.

The reassortment/recombination debate... I don't waste much time worrying about it. Reassortment simply means genes already in the virus change positions on the genome. It's as though you rearranged your ornaments on a shelf - same ornaments, different positions. With viruses, that MAY result in the virus acting in new & interesting ways.

Recombination is of course, genes from one subtype mixing with another. A virus may pick up an entire new genetic sequence from another subtype with which it finds itself in close proximity or a partial one. With H5N1, we're concerned about that puppy picking up the ability, (from a known humanly pathogenic subtype), to more easily infect humans & of course, more easily go human to human.

In terms of recent Chinese isolates, we can guess, prognosticate, model & predict as much as we'd like but without having samples in our hot little hands, we simply don't know. It's no doubt changing at a high rate of knots; flu viruses do that as a matter of fact. It can be reassortment, recombination... the net effect will be the same & it's the net effect on US & our agricultural animals I worry about. I'm not inclined, nor do I have the time, to get into bun fights, (not that I'm qualified to do so), with anyone over the CAUSE of change in the virus. It's the fact that it does appear to be changing rapidly & increasingly gaining new abilities to do so that has me concerned.

Of course I wish we had samples & honest epidemiology from all affected areas. We don't. We won't. Again, I'm not gonna waste energy beating on anybody & crying foul. It won't do any good. It won't do anyone any good & wastes time I don't have. I'm more concerned with spotting the first pandemic wave. Once that hits & is undeniable, believe me; no one will care much what the specific evolutionary mechanism was - unless it affects a possible treatment course or potential vax & that's proprietory anyway. The effort at that point will have to do to slowing that bugger down until some vax can be prepared; if we can even manage that. It may continue to merrily mutate around any effort we can muster up & anything we produce may simply not work by the time we get it into mass production. 

__________________ 
Bunnies love me, this I know
'Cause Arubi tells me so. 

The US army and intelligence is in Karzatkan or kurdadskan, you know that country that needs a course to know how to pronounce it, and some Tibetans should take some blood sample too.

Not sure that will go straight to the Gen Bank fast tough. 

H5N1 has been evolving via recombination in Asia since 1996, so although I haven't seen the latest from Qinghai or Xinjiang, the recombination part is an easy call. H5N1 has been pathological to geese in the past, including 1996, and the recombination happens each season.

I would epxect H5N1 isolates from the bar headed geese in Qinghai to be virtually identical to the domestic geese in in Xinjiang with evidence of recombination when compared to earlier versions.

H5N1 and all influenza (and other viruses) follow some very specific rules when they evolve rapidly, and I haven't seen anything to remotely suggest that the isolates in western China will be any different than the earlier versions. 

***H5N1 and all influenza (and other viruses) follow some very specific rules when they evolve rapidly, and I haven't seen anything to remotely suggest that the isolates in western China will be any different than the earlier versions.***

By 'earlier versions' - are you referring to the recent outbreak in Qinghai or are you going back further in time?Do you think reconbimation has happened with H5N1 & other avian subtypes or/also human subtypes? 

__________________ 
Bunnies love me, this I know
'Cause Arubi tells me so. 

Virtually all viruses that evolve rapidly do so via recombination, including avian and human influenza A. The rate of evolution is dependent on dual infections by diverse genomes.

I expect H5N1 in Qinghai and Xinjiang to look virtually identical to each other, but significantly different than isolates in northern or southern Vietnam. 

Dr Niman,

Thank you for your response but, with all due respect, I don't believe you really addressed my questions:

1. Why have you concluded that a recombination event produced the Qinghai and Xinjiang H5N1 circulating forms as you have not seen the sequences?

2. What statistical tests have you used to confirm recombination in earlier H5N1 outbreaks? What are the parental forms? How have you ruled out differential evolutionary rates as the source of different pairwise differences between two forms?

3. Has your work appeared in a peer-reviewed journal or are we taking you at your word? 

There is no differential rates. Recombination is across all 8 genes and has been going on for quite some time.

The influenza dogma has a limited life span (measured in weeks). The polymerase is able to faithfully reproduce perfect copies of genes for year's on end (publicly available at GenBank)

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/0...assortment.html

The annual differences are due to reshuffling old polymorphisms (like the HA cleavage site).

I haven't seen the Qinghai sequences, but H5N1 is a rule follower, not a rule breaker.

The differential evolutionary rates are due to recombination, which is how H5N1 evolves! 

Dr. Niman,

Can you explain how your opening statement "There is no different rates" is not incongruent with "The diferential evolutionary rates are due to recombination."

Again, what test have you used to confirm a recombination event? Bootscanning? GENECONV? Homoplasy test?

And finally, has your work -- and the "rules" you speak of -- been published in a peer-reviewed journal? 

Exact same strategy a couple of years ago. Got him googled a lot. lol

Just scroll down through some of these and he is referred to often for the same reason he is now.


http://www.sarsandpigs.blogspot.com/

fear-mongering

imo 

Science Now is quoting sequencers from China as saying the H5N1 sequences from Qinghai are similar to those in southeastern China, which of course are recombinants.

Your questions of publication of the recombination rules have been asked and answered.

As far as proving receombination is concerned, why would I use techniques that created the mutation/reassortment myths on viral evolution?

Why build a house on crumbling pillars? In a few months the pillars will be just a big pile of sand. 

More conspiracy theories? How about a link to all of the dead scientists? 

Dr. Niman,

I have asked, repeatedly, for specific answers to specific questions and you have responded with rhetoric and vague assertions.

For your information, I come at this question not from the so-called "myths" of influenza genetics but from the molecular epidemiology of HIV-1. As you might know, recombination is an accepted method for the generation of viral genetic diversity for HIV-1. And, as you know, recombination events are proven through specific statistical tests of viral genomes and sequences.

For the final time: Are your conclusions about the alleged recombination of H5N1 based on observed sequences and accepted statistical tests or are we supposed to believe your unproven, untested assertions based on the force of your rhetoric?

My house is built on the enduring pillars of the scientific method. And yours?


M-J 

You can google better than I. So, if that's where your best techniques are, go for it.

You say you knew this Wiley fellow. If so, why would you be so quick to dismiss his murder? You tried to say the trucker who phoned in the 9-11 call saw Wiley fall off the ledge. The trucker didn't see him. Nobody saw him until his dead body finally washed up. You must know this. Why try to mislead?

Take the last death if you wish. Not in any preconceived google context, but on its own merits. I think you might recognize how this one could have known about some of the lab escapades. http://rigorousintuition.blogspot.c...t-murdered.html

BTW, aren't you connected with someone on the CFR? I believe I ran across an article somewhere which had you associated. 

You will see that recombination goes well beyond observations in HIV or picornaviruses, both noted for recombination.

As has been noted previously, comments on publications and patents have been presented.

How about some stats on M gene in a 1998 pig in Hong Hong and a 2003 chicken in South Korea. Influenza genetics relies on random mutations to change genes (which change every year). Reassortment just shuffles genes. It does not create any new genes.

How can an error prone polymerase lacking a proof reading function copy over 800 nucleotides faithfully for five years in two species in two countries, both with histories of genetic instability?

Although I have mentioned pillars in influenza genetics falling, the collapse will be quite universal and will include HIV.

As my 11 year old daughter asked, how can something discovered in 1953 go unnoticed for over 50 years.

Answer is quite simple. Group think is alive and well in the scientific community also. 

The answer is:

Recombination in a lab.

Unnatural science at work. 

Is that what Google says? 

Many people, in multiple places in the world, have H5N1 antibodies but don't have symptoms.

What's the significance of this? 

Messrs. Milloy, Anymo,

How do you explain this observation of Niman's?
> How about some stats on M gene in a 1998 pig in Hong Hong and a 2003 chicken in South Korea. Influenza genetics relies on random mutations to change genes (which change every year). Reassortment just shuffles genes. It does not create any new genes.

How can an error prone polymerase lacking a proof reading function copy over 800 nucleotides faithfully for five years in two species in two countries, both with histories of genetic instability?>

Irrespective of the point that you continue seek, Milloy, are these facts cause for you to question the methodology that you employ to reach doubt? 

The trucker called in the car that was blocking the one lane available to cross the bridge. Not a good place to commit a murder. Lots of risk, no reward. There is no evidence for a murder other than google searches which can find scientists who died of natural and unnatural causes, which is the case for the scientists on the lists.

It's a story fueled by simple google searches by conspiracy theorists and/or posts by gullible readers. 

Hey, anymo, what's your point and purpose, please?

All you are doing is making Dr. Niman look BETTER and BRAVER, while he shrugs off your needling nonsense about dead microbiologists.

Are you really a secret fan of his, or something?

Hey, mjmilloy, I love your new website. It is great. Your questions to Dr. Niman are way over my head, but why do you need them answered?

Whatever and whenever viral or influenza theory is proven correct, (Dr. Niman's or others) , it is NOW TOO LATE to utilize any of the theories to protect the world from the influenza plague--- "coming soon to a theatre near YOU!". Spreading the word to PREPARE makes a lot more sense---especially on a local level---your friends, your community, your wonderful
website. 

Come on, you guys! It's like the folks who years ago were postulating Black Holes and Quarks. No way to PROVE them at the time of postulation, time had to pass before the methods changed enough to fit the postulation/theories and then BINGO, it all made sense. Let Dr. Nimen do his thing and you certainly do your's and time will tell who has the right of it. Peer review may be the standard for new theories/postulations but peer review many times is stuck in the OLD patterns of thought and method. Sort of like stacking a jury in a trial. To the majority of us laymen it is meaningless and most of us here ARE laymen just concerned with our and our familie's health and welfare. I suggest you all take your technical questions and picking points privately instead of airing them publically where us laymen are getting cut out of the "discussions" such as they are. I don't think we are impressed with your pickyun points of attacks - we sure do not understand what you are talking about. 

Anymo, How often has science developed THEORY from observation and knowledge, as Dr. Niman's work does? It's too bad scientists don't have Asian viruses isolated today in some pristine science lab where they could document, document, document and write articles and books . . . . but the point here is really about time. I'd rather hear from you your own scientific ideas (theories???) about the flu; what are they? Or is your interest simply to denigrate the ideas of others?

"You don't have to be a weatherman to know which way the wind blows."
Bob Dylan 

Perhaps a couple of you should re-read your own header description:

"A special wing of the CE Lab set aside for discussing all aspects of dealing with influenza, especially matters related to the new H5N1 avian flu."

It doesn't limit discussion to what you claim.

Dr. N should be able to answer a couple of pointed questions relating to his claims and evasions of answers.

Maybe the rest of you could pow-wow and write up a better heading for yourselves if you expect others to know about your "rules".

----------'

Dr. N. -- my point, as you know, was that Wiley was NOT killed on that bridge.

AND -- I suppose you are content with calling stabbings, burnings and shootings -- google searches. That's quite an interesting evasive strategy. 

Regarding the Milloy/Niman discussion, I'm a bit confused:

MILLOY: > For your information, I come at this question not from the so-called "myths" of influenza genetics but from the molecular epidemiology of HIV-1. As you might know, recombination is an accepted method for the generation of viral genetic diversity for HIV-1. And, as you know, recombination events are proven through specific statistical tests of viral genomes and sequences.

> Are your conclusions about the alleged recombination of H5N1 based on observed sequences and accepted statistical tests or are we supposed to believe your unproven, untested assertions based on the force of your rhetoric?

NIMAN: > How about some stats on M gene in a 1998 pig in Hong Hong and a 2003 chicken in South Korea. Influenza genetics relies on random mutations to change genes (which change every year). Reassortment just shuffles genes. It does not create any new genes.

> How can an error prone polymerase lacking a proof reading function copy over 800 nucleotides faithfully for five years in two species in two countries, both with histories of genetic instability.

AND, PREVIOUSLY:

MILLOY: > Can you explain how your opening statement "There is no different rates" is not incongruent with "The diferential evolutionary rates are due to recombination."

> Again, what test have you used to confirm a recombination event? Bootscanning? GENECONV? Homoplasy test?

> And finally, has your work -- and the "rules" you speak of -- been published in a peer-reviewed journal?

NIMAN: > As far as proving recombination[sp] is concerned, why would I use techniques that created the mutation/reassortment myths on viral evolution?


GR: To me, this is peer review, in public. Dr. Niman's theory, which many of this group support, is being examined by a scientist, from a scientific perspective. Fair questions invite fair answers. If there is a paper that is being peer reviewed now, by Niman, or is first stages of being so, if it is within normal science, we would appreciate knowing about that. It appears that Milloy is asking Niman not for facts that support Niman's position, but tests that reconfirm Niman's statements. Here, some see this as theoretical biology which requires, post hoc, development of scientific experiements to prove the statements, which in all fairness may not be the realm or responsibility of the theorist. I'm seeking clarity, on behalf of both these gentlemen. Would you both comment on your interaction above? 

If your only standard is Niman's, how far a stretch is it from the following statement by him and the situations with H5N1? (Just trying to go by your rules.)


Recombinomics, Inc. President, Dr. Henry L Niman, believes the current Marburg epidemic, rapidly spreading in urban Angola, was “seededâ€? into vaccines given to African infants and young poor children. (See: http://www.recombinomics.com/News/0...rg_Seeding.html) 

here's a snip from wired.com

>Niman has two papers ready to submit, but he is waiting for key information about some pigs in South Korea that he says could clinch his case for recombination.

Niman says gene sequences of the flu infecting the pigs -- posted in October 2004 to GenBank, a public gene database -- contain genes that are part human and part avian.

"Anybody looking at the sequence would come to the conclusion that it's recombination," Niman said.

Most worrisome is that the human segment of the flu appears to be derived from a 1933 virus related to the one that caused the 1918 flu pandemic. Most human immune systems would have no defense against it, because it was man-made in a London lab in 1940.

But now, the World Health Organization and the South Korean government say the sequence may have been caused by a lab error. Niman is waiting for three independent labs to verify the pig samples before he submits his research to a peer-reviewed journal.< 

>It begins with this official account told by Laurie Garrett at the Council on Foreign Relations.

In December, somebody from one of South Korea's veterinary schools did what hundreds of virus-hunters do the world over: he or she e-mailed to GenBank the genetic details of newly identified viruses. In this case, the posting said, six new strains of influenza had been found in local pigs. Each of the strains were genetically manipulated and contained genetic bits of an avian virus unlike those now prompting separate bird flu concerns.
Worse, there were large segments of a flu bug dubbed WSN/33, a human flu virus altered in 1933 in a laboratory by infecting mice, resulting in a strain that kills mouse brain cells. The original 1933 human virus was related to that which caused the 1918 pandemic flu, killing an estimated 50 million people. Nothing even remotely like the WSN/33 flu has circulated in the world since 1956, and this particular WSN-avian flu combination is not known to have ever occurred naturally, so most of the global population would have little or no immunity to the virus. Since neither the particular bird flu strain nor the WSN/33 flu were known to exist outside of laboratories, one Internet journal concluded that "these sequences could represent a military experiment that resulted in an unplanned release. Moreover, at this point, bioterrorism cannot be ruled out."

The World Health Organization's (WHO) influenza branch responded later in December, convening a teleconferenced meeting of flu experts to analyze the GenBank information and exchanging a flurry of e-mails. They concluded somebody had made a lab error. On January 27, the South Korean government confirmed a laboratory error had been made and promised to send samples of the six viruses to WHO's Hong Kong collaborative lab.

But at press time the South Koreans had not sent the promised samples.
[...]
What happened? Nobody, except perhaps the silent South Koreans, knows for sure. But there are two general hypotheses, WHO says. Someone in the South Korean veterinary lab may have innocently pulled the wrong computer file of genetic sequence data into an e-mailed transmission to GenBank, resulting in the display of this potentially terrible viral code. The lab in question may have contaminated its research samples. Or the South Korean lab is working on a flu vaccine, using the WSN/33 human sequence from 1933 as a basic template and deliberately scrambling it with various animal flus. In such a scenario, the scientists accidentally created these disturbing influenza strains in the lab in their vaccine production effort. I cannot accept the vaccine idea: why in the world would anybody be making a vaccine against a type of human flu that hasn't circulated on earth for more than 70 years? If lab contamination or data input error are the problem, I am left to fret about a host of recent lab accidents that, in some cases, have allowed dangerous microbes to leak, including SARS and tularemia.

Dr. Niman posted several responses to specific statements made by the CFR at the Recombinomics site, more specifically in regards to the virus' Laboratory Origins, its Nature and the world's Bioterror Preparedness. Excerpt from these responses selected by myself are as follows:

"Since the human WSN/33 sequences at GenBank do not appear to be contaminants, their route from a lab to swine on a farm is of great interest. The two most likely possibilities are an accidental release, or an act of bioterrorism."
"The selection of WSN/33 as a human virus for mixing experiment seems wrong for a civilian lab. Mixing experiments with contemporary human viruses would yield the same answers and would be safer....A more sinister explanation would involve bioterrorism. The bioterror act could simply involve infecting swine with WSN/33. This could have been followed by dual infections by Korean avian viruses which led to the reassortants and recombinants."

"At this point all of the possibilities are speculative and open because there has been no investigation into the origins of the sequences. The existence of the human WSN/33 sequences in swine still remains unclear 4 months after the sequences were deposited at GenBank, and long after a putative terrorist attack."

"The mysterious origin of the WSN/33 swine sequences at GenBank remains unsolved. ...The fact that the existence of the associated viruses remains unresolved is truly remarkable. If the sequences are real, and no credible evidence has been presented to show that they are not, then at a minimum there was a major laboratory lapse that allowed a dangerous human virus to escape and infect swine in conjunction with avian flu viruses."

"It is hard to imagine someone suggesting the sequences at GenBank are a wrong computer file. The data deposited are extensive...simply looking at the sequences alone would have eliminated the "wrong file" nonsense."

"The issue of contamination is always a difficult one. However, in this case it seems unlikely.... [Yet these] difficulties did not prevent South Korea from telling WHO that the sequences were a lab error, using yet another human virus as evidence. It is extremely difficult to even come up with an improbable scenario to implicate a different human sequence."

"As more and more announcements on the looming flu pandemic hit the news services and the public realizes that pandemic preparedness in 2005 is not much better than it was in 1918, the issue of bioterrorism preparedness is again being raised. The bird / human flu situation in South Korea is being cited as a "scary near miss" to show how unprepared the US is for bioterrorism.

However, the characterization of the WSN/33 situation in pigs on farms in South Korea is clearly not in the "near miss" category at this time. The situation is unresolved and although several explanations have been offered, the likelihood of the explanations being correct is very close to zero."

"The existence and location of the sequences is not an academic exercise. WSN/33 is quite lethal in mice and two of the sequences are H1N1 which would be readily transmissible from human-to-human. Since these sequences are from 1933, most people would be immunologically naïve to these proteins, so infections in humans could have severe consequences.

Since South Korea is saying that there are no WSN/33 sequences in pigs and the data are lab errors, the source of these swine sequences is not being investigated.

Thus, the existence of the sequences in swine has not been resolved for four months after they were placed on deposit at Genbank.

Bioterrorism and Pandemic Preparedness are interesting concepts, but avian influenza continues to evolve and gain pandemic potential as governments spin wheels, issue warnings, and hope for the best."



Dr. Niman's point seems clear: the South Korean outbreaks are obviously manmade viruses, and they were more than likely intentionally introduced into the porcine population in hopes they would quickly mutate into a more 'human-friendly' form. His assessment, which matches that of Laurie Garrett at the Council on Foreign Relations, is that both the U.S. and the World are simply unable to adequately respond to a viral pandemic or bioterror event.
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary defines terror as "violence (as bombing) committed by groups in order to intimidate a population or government into granting their demands." What 'groups' could we imagine might be behind a viral release into the South Korean pig population? North Korea springs immediately to mind. An influenza strain which could propagate efficiently among humans would doubtlessly leave South Korea, and much of the world, in a desperate state of fear and disorder. North Korea, being substantially 'quarantined' from incoming travel, might believe they could effectively avoid the pandemic. Also, for a country which appears to be imploding on itself, North Korea has the kind of desperation needed to instigate an act of terrorism 'against the whole wide world'.

But if so, why would South Korea be trying to cover up the situation?<

And I'll add, why would Dr. N now be trying to cover up the situation? I'm sure it could be a profitable situation for him if he is cooperating nicely. 

You are correct. He was not killed. He fell off the bridge as described in the coroner's autopsy report. The only link between Wiley's death and the other deaths on the list are Google searches, as are the only links between the other deaths.

The reports on scientist's are somewhat like a chain Miscrosoft/disney land chain letter that has been circulating for a decade. Utter nonsense propagated by urban legend believers.

The only real danger is from the true believers of the legend (and of course none of this has anything to do with influenza or bioweapons). 

Patent claims are being broadened this week and the recombination paper is also being submitted to Nature (it will be reviewer proof). Reviews at Nature can be fast-tracked, which is what I expect in this case. The paper will destroy the two influenza myths on the significance of random mutations and reassortment.

Several related papers on pandemic evolution and other virals systems will follow. These papers will generate a true paradigm shift on how infectious diseases are characterized and treated at the genetic level.. 

Quoting misquotes doesn't score many points. 

So did someone else also create your title in that link for you?

Or was it tomato seeds you referred to?

>Marburg Seeding Linked to Childhood Vaccine Program?<

The above is clear. And it's on YOUR site.

Nice try. I suppose. 

There have been subsequent commentaries indicating WHO was quite wrong on the comments that WSN/33 was a contaminant and just before the meeting in Manila on of their top scientists who is frequently quoted in media reports was at the Sang Seo lab and saw the evolving WSN/33 data generated in his presence. WHO and consultants should be well aware of the fact they they were very wrong on this and WSN/33 in pigs on farms in South Korea is a major public health concern.

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/0...Cinco_Mayo.html

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/0...Cinco_Mayo.html

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/0..._H1N2_H9N2.html

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/0...33_Scandle.html 

You certification as a conspiracy theorist is abundantly clear. Your interpretations speak for themselves and require no further response from me (although GR may want to comment on his early assessment). 

I am content to derive my beliefs of what WHO thinks from my own reading of WHO statements.

Suffice it to say that I think you are a sell-out & in more than one way. 

I think you missed the question mark. 

I have a pretty good feel for what conspiracy theorists believe, which is why I mentioned that they are much more of a threat to scientists than Google lists or urban legends.